Kacorev et al. proposed new public key encryption scheme using chaotic maps. Subsequently, Bergamo et al. has broken Kacorev and Tasev's encryption scheme and then applied the attack on a key agreement protocol based on Kacorev et al. 's system. In order to address Bergamo et al.' attack, Xiao et al. proposed a novel key agreement protocol. In this paper, we will present two attacks on Xiao et al.'s key agreement protocol using chaotic maps. Our new attack method is different from the one that Bergamo et al. developed. The proposed attacks work in a way that an adversary can prevent the user and the server from establishing a shared session key even though the adversary cannot get any private information from the user and the server's communications.
Introduction
Chaos is a universal, random-like and robust phenomenon in nonlinear sys tems. Chaotic systems are characterized by sensitive dependence on initial conditions and similarity to random behavior. Chaotic systems have been used to design and analyze secure communications [3] [4] [5] [6] 13] . There are two main methods in the design of chaotic secure communication schemes: one is analog method, the other is discrete digital method. In the analog method, chaos synchronization is achieved using chaotic circuits, where the communication parties take advantage of the chaotic synchronization to implement secure 2 communication [3, 6, 12] . In the discrete digital method, chaotic systems are used to generate chaotic ciphers for secure communication [4] .
A key agreement protocol is used to derive a shared secret by two or more parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these, but no party can predetermine the resulting value [8] . Xiao et al. pro posed a key agreement protocol based on chaotic maps [9] , which was proved to be broken by Bergamo et al.'s method [1, 2] . In Bergamo et al.'s method, an adversary can retrieve the private information from the communication par ties. Recently, a new key agreement protocol was proposed based on chaotic maps [11] . This new protocol has greatly enhanced the security against Berg amo et al. 's compromise method.
In this paper, we will provide a security analysis of Xiao et al.'s key agreement protocol based on chaotic maps. We will develop new attacks on their protocol. We will demonstrate that their protocol is not secure against these attacks. In these attacks, an adversary can successfully prevent communication parties from establishing a secret shared session key. '8 • (1) User A chooses a random number ra E [-1,1]' then he sends his user identity number, IDA, and ra to server B.
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• (2) Server B chooses a random number rb E [-1, l] and sends it back to user A.
• (3) User A juxtaposes hpw , ra and rb from left to right as the pending message, and uses the one-way hash function He) to compute the authenti cation value AU = H (hpw , ra, rb) . Then he sends IDA and AU to server B.
• (4) Server B takes out his own copies of hpw , ra and rb corresponding to the user identity number IDA. Then she uses the same Hash function to compute AU' = H(h pw , ra, rb) similarly.
• (5) After receiving AU, server B compares it with the computed AU'. If they are equal, then the identity of A is authenticated. By using the random number ra chosen in Step 1 as the seed x of the Chebyshev polynomial map, the key agreement operations are performed as follows:
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• (6) User A chooses a random integer T' and computes X = Ehpw(Tr(x)), and then sends it to B. Simple stream XOR approach can be used as the encryption algorithm here.
• (7) Server B chooses a random integer s and computes Y = Ehpw(Ts(x)), then sends it to A.
• (8) User A and Server B decrypts X and Y, respectively, then computes the shared secret key: k = Tr{Tx{x)) = Ts(Tr(x)) Trs(x).
Hash function based on chaotic maps
The hash function used in the above key agreement is a hash function based on chaotic maps. One dimension piecewise linear chaotic system is defined as
where X E [0,1], P E (0, 0.5). Xo and Ho are secretly chosen from [0,1] as the keys. The 3-unit iterations, 1st to :.Ith, (:.I+ 1 )th to 2Nth, (2)I+l)th to 3Nth, ensure that each bit of the final hash value will be related to all the bits of messages [10] . The following is a briefreferring to how to generate the hash value:
• (1) Translates the pending message to the corresponding ASCII numbers, then maps these ASCII numbers by means of linear transform into an array C, whose elements are numbers in [0, 1] and whose length N is the number of characters in the message.
• (2) The iteration process is as follows:
2nd to Nth:
(N+l )th:
(N+ 2) to 2Nth: I;
• (3) Transforms X N , X 2N , X 3N to the corresponding binary format, extracts 40, 40, 48 bits after the decimal point, respectively, and juxtaposes them from left to right to get a 128-bit final hash value. and Ts(x). Therefore, it is impossible to find r' or s' such that Tr'(x) = Tr(x) or TS'(X) = Ts(x).
Security of Xiao et al. 's key agreement protocol
In this section, we will develop three attacks on Xiao et al. 's key agreement protocol. From these attacks we can see that the novel key agreement protocol in [11] is still vulnerable and cannot help the user and the server to fulfil their purpose in establishing a secure session key.
Attacks on Xiao et al. '8 key agreement protocol
For each full run of the key agreement in Section 2, we call it a protocol run. For the i-th full run of the key agreement, we call it the i-th protocol run.
Suppose the seeds for the Chebyshev polynomial map in the i-th protocol run and the j-th protocol run are x and y, respectively. Here, i < j and x =1= y (x, y E [-1,1] are random numbers).
Approach 1

With different seeds x and y
In the i-th protocol run, we inspect the step 6 and the step 7.
(Step 6i) User A chooses a random integer r and computes Xi = E"pw(Tr(x)), and then sends it to server B.
(Step 7i) Server B chooses a random integer s and computes Yi = E"pw(Ts(x)), then sends it to user A.
An adversary can easily intercept Xi and Yi. Actually, this adversary cannot get Tr(x) and Ts(x) since they are encrypted. However, the adversary can take advantage of Xi and Yi as soon as she tries to prevent user A and server B from establishing a shared session key in the j-th protocol run. In the following, we look at the j-th protocol run through step-by-step to demonstrate how the adversary can prevent user A and server B from establishing a shared session key.
The j-th protocol run:
• (Step 1j) User A chooses a random number y E [-1,1], then he sends his user identity number, IDA, and y to server B.
• (Step 2j) Server B chooses a random number rb E [-1,1] and sends it back to user A.
• (Step 3j) User A juxtaposes hpw , y and rb from left to right as the pending message, and uses the one-way hash function He) to compute the authen tication value AU H(hpw , y, rb) . Then he sends IDA and AU to server B.
• (Step 4j) Server B takes out his own copies of hpw , y and rb corresponding to the user identity number IDA' Then she uses the same Hash function to compute AU' H(hpw , y, rb) similarly.
• (Step 5j) After receiving AU, server B compares it with the computed AU'. If they are equal, then the identity of A is authenticated. By using the random number y chosen in Step 1j as the seed of the Cheby shev polynomial map, then
• (Step 6j) User A chooses a random integer rj and computes Xj = E"pw (Trj (y)), and then sends it to B.
• (Step 7.1j) The adversary intercepts Xj and does not let it arrive at server B.
• (Step 7.2j) The adversary replaces Xj with Xi which was intercepted in the i-th protocol run. Then the adversary sends Xi to server B.
• (Step 7.3j) After receiving Xi, Server B chooses a random integer Sj and computes Yj Ehpw(Tsj(Y))' then sends it to A.
• (Step 8.1j) After receiving it, User A decrypts Yj -E hpw (Tsj (Y)), then computes the shared secret key:
(2)
• (Step 8.2j) After receiving Xi, Server B decrypts Xi Ehpw (Tr(x) ), then computes the shared secret key:
After the j-th protocol run is completed, it is easy to see that Trjsj(Y) =1= Trs)x). This is because of the randomness of x and Y as well as rj and r. Therefore, the adversary successfully prevented user A and server B from establishing a shared session key.
Approach 2
With different secret random integers rj, sand Sj, and different seeds x and WI'
• (Step Ij) User A chooses a random number Yjl E 1,1], then he sends his user identity number, IDA, and Yjl to server B.
• (Step 2j) Server B chooses a random number Yh E [-1, 1] and sends it back to user A.
• (Step 3j) User A juxtaposes hpw , Yjl and rb from left to right as the pending message, and uses the one-way hash function H(-) to compute the authenti cation value AU = H(h pw,YjpYj3) . Then he sends IDA and AU to server B.
• (Step 4j) Server B takes out his own copies of hpw, Yjl and rb corresponding to the user identity number IDA. Then she uses the same Hash function to compute AU' H(h pw , Yh, Yj3) similarly.
• (Step 5j) After receiving AU, server B compares it with the computed AU'. If they are equal, then the identity of A is authenticated.
By using the random number Yjj chosen in Step 1j as the seed of the Cheby shev polynomial map, then
• (Step 6j) User A chooses a random integer rj and computes Xj = E hpw (T rj (Yjj)), and then sends it to B.
• (Step 7.1j) After receiving X), Server B chooses a random integer 8j and computes }j = E hpw (Tsj (Yjj)), then sends it to A.
• (Step 7.2j) The adversary intercepts }j and does not let it arrive at user A.
• (Step 7.3j) The adversary replaces Yj with Yi which was intercepted in the i-th protocol run. Then the adversary sends Yi to user A.
• (Step 8.1j) User A decrypts Yi, then computes the shared secret key:
• (Step 8.2j) Server B decrypts Xj, then computes the shared secret key:
After the j-th protocol run is completed, because of the randomness of rj, 8j and 8, as well as Yjl and x, it is easy to see that kA =I-k B . Therefore, the adversary successfully prevented user A and server B from establishing a shared session key.
Approach 3
With different secret random integers rj, 8, 8j and rj.
• (Step 1j) User A chooses a random number Yh E 1,1]' then he sends his user identity number, IDA, and Yh to server B.
• (Step 2j) Server B chooses a random number rb E 1,1] and sends it back to user A.
• • (Step 7.1j) The adversary intercepts Xj and does not let it arrive at server B.
• (Step 7.3j) After receiving Xi) Server B chooses a random integer 8j and computes Yj = Ehpw(Tsj(Yh)), then sends it to A.
• (Step 7.4j) The adversary intercepts Yj and does not let it arrive at user A.
• (Step 7.5j) The adversary replaces Yj with Yi which was intercepted in the i-th protocol run. Then the adversary sends Yi to user A.
• (Step 8.2j) Server B decrypts Xi, then computes the shared secret key:
After the j-th protocol run is completed, because of the randomness of Tj, r, 8j, and 8, it is easy to see that TTjS(X) =/: TTSj (x). Therefore, the adver sary successfully prevented user A and server B from establishing a shared session key, which will be used for subsequent cryptographic applications and communications.
Conclusions
The idea of Xiao et al. 's key agreement is novel. Their new key agreement protocol enhanced the security of key agreement based on chaotic maps such that it can resist Bergamo et al.'s attack. However, in this paper, we pointed out that there still exist security issues in their protocol. The developed new attacks can hinder the user and the server from accomplishing a shared secret session key.
